Non-emergence?

According to Robert Laughlin Nobel Prize winner physicist, Newton’s “fundamental laws” aren’t fundamental at all, since their rise is “a consequence of the aggregation  of quantum matter into macroscopic fluids and solids—a collective  organizational phenomenon.” [Laughlin: A Different Universe, p. 31.] So perhaps we can build up a physics based on the idea of emergence, and it is at least questionable whether either the fundamental laws or the fundamental constants remain important after reinterpreting this field.
It is undoubtedly an interesting idea, and I don’t have any problem with the approach of a new interpretation of nature. But I have some problems with this emergent approach.
First of all, why do we presuppose that the laws of the quantum level is more fundamental than the level of Newtonian physics? Because is it about a smaller magnitude?
Second of all, the use of the term of the emergence is sometimes resembles for the “God of the gasp”: Certain theologians interpret the gaps in actual scientific knowledge as a proof of the existence of the Lord. The classical example for the emergence is the ant hill, and I don’t think that the emergent interpretation is false in this case. But notice that the emergent approach offers an answer for the strangeness of a certain phenomenon (i.e. organized ant behavior), and, at the same time, it contains a tacit an assumption.
The “normal” scientific way is to observe a natural processes and then, by using induction, we deduce the natural law which resulted the given process. The emergent approach is different: we hypothesize that not some describable laws (that are descriptions of the rules) cause the phenomenon, but the phenomenon causes the effect. But, ad absurdum, it is possible that although there is a natural law to determine the organization of the ant society, having been unable to point out it, we would declare that this process’ nature is emergent. If Newton’s laws would be unknown, then we could state with conviction that the moves of the planets in the Solar System are emergent: We observe the process, and then we conclude that the process itself causes the phenomenon. Ad analogiam: how could we sure that there isn’t a law to describe the connections between the micro- and macroscopic level in Laughlin’s example?
Of course, there are emergent processes: I.e. Wolfram in his New Kind of Science presents examples where a process is uncompressible. But there are fundamental differences between math where, optimally, we can prove whether something is impossible, and physics where a similar demonstration is more problematic.
And there are other questions, as well. The dichotomy of “laws” and “objects” comes from Aristotle: He believed that on the one hand, there is a category of “natural things, which displayed change and complexity”, and there are “static and absolute truths” that are mathematical rules. [Barrow: World within World, p. 39.] Obviously, it is a kind of Pythagorean belief about the fundamentally mathematical nature of the Universe.
But it is an important question whether both the laws and objects really exist, as it is believed by the so-called realist philosophers of science. Opposite to it, the instrumentalists state that the physical laws are only instruments to describe the observed processes but they aren’t exist in reality.
It is undecidable which camp is right, since there is no an experiment to point out whether a natural law really exists or it is only a mathematical description. In short: it is pointless to debate over it.
Similarly, it is undecidable whether the individual ants’ behavior emerge into a coordinated activity to cause the anthill or the rules behind the operation of the colony drives the individuals.

The origin of the multiverse

According to Aristotle our world which had a potentially infinite past and it’s spatially extension was finite, but a potentially infinite past is unacceptable today, since it necessarily ends in our present. So it is completed – and so it cannot be potential (but a potentially infinite future is still a possibility). Obviously, Aristotle’s finite space conception is similarly contradictory for us, as it is based on the belief in a finite, spherical shell of the stars that surrounds the Universe.
Newton believed in actually infinite space and finite time – namely, according to him the World was created some thousand years ago (of course, if we do not accept the existence of a final point in history, then it has a potentially infinite future).
The Big Bang Theory uses a finite spacetime model.
Last but not least, according to a common interpretation, the multiverse hypothesis presumes that both space and time is actually infinite and the Big Bang is only a bubble in the infinite sea of other bubbles. This resembles to the Steady State Theory, since it declares a spatiotemporal infinity without a beginning (and it is ironic that this obsolete model, which is forgotten in traditional cosmology, survives in this form). As far as I know, nobody examined the question of the possible origin of the multiverse as a scientific problem. Of course, if you believe that it has no origin (since it is spatiotemporally infinite), then it is a meaningless question.
But we can play either with the idea of a spatiotemporally finite multiverse that includes  only finitely many universes.The fact that we cannot able observe other worlds, does not mean that there are infinitely many of them.
Or there is a possible multiverse model where time is finite (or potentially infinite), but its space is actually infinite. In other words: it is a multiverse that was born a finite time ago but it is spatially infinite since the beginning, and it resembles to Newton’s model in a certain way. The appearance of infinity is always problematic in physics, so – at least from this point of view – this model with an instant spatially infinity is not more contradictory than the traditional multiverse interpretation with an infinite past.

The short history of the maximum speed

“Nature abhors a vacuum” says Aristotle. His argumentation based on the presupposition that in complete void there would not have any resistance to slow down a body’s motion, so its speed would be actually infinite – although he was convinced that only potential, but not actual infinite exists.
Newton represents another extremity using the idea of an instantaneous “action at a distance”. According to his theory, gravitation can act instantly even from infinite distance. Newton “left to… [his] readers” to decide whether that agent caused gravity was “material or immaterial.” [Newton: letters to Bentley] This “action at a distance” was regarded to be too mysterious and too similar to the magical forces to his contemporaries, but thanks to Laplace’s, Lagrange’s and others’ interpretation of physics as a pure mathematical description the problem seemed to be vanish [Roland Omnés: Quantum Philosophy 1999, p. 35].
Einstein’s world different from his forerunners’. Newton believed in absolute space and absolute time – they functioned as the base of a reference system and motion happened relative to it.
Opposite to this interpretation, Einstein voted for the speed of light as the maximum speed of anything can reach in our Universe, and it was absolute to any inertial frame of reference. Thus neither space nor time, but this constant (speed of light) was absolute as a barrier. It was a solution for the result of the Michelson – Morley experiment which originally aimed to verify the existence of ether as the medium of light waves, but it was a failure (notice that even Maxwell’s equation based on his confidence in the existence of ether [Omnés, p. 44]).
Einstein’s model is surely more counterintuitive than Aristotle’s or Newton’s (and it is not an accident that this appeared finally). On the other hand, it is surprisingly simple: there is no a body with mas which can reach the speed of light; and a particle with zero rest mass moves with the speed of light. That’s all. Notice that Einstein’s solution is instrumentalist in a certain sense, since it doesn’t explain why the speed of light is so special – it simply accepts its absoluteness. An instrumentalist approach can results a working model (see the Ptolemaic worldview), but it is not connected to the physical reality, since its subject is not the real world, but only a description of the real world. This means that it can be proven false at any time (as it happened in Ptolemy’s case).
There are some possible scenarios at this point.
We can believe that Einstein’s model is flawless. Obviously, it is the simplest solution. Although it is true that all the previous models proved to be incorrect, it is not a necessity that this theory will be proven to be false. Similarly, we cannot be sure that because it seemingly immaculate, it well be unchallengeable in the future. In fact, there are critics of Einstein’s theory today: according to Joseph Lévy, “the speed of light was erroneously found to be constant” [From Galileo to Lorenz… and Beyond 2002, p. 2]. In the age of Galileo the Aristotelian science was replaced by the “New Physics” within some decades, but the institutional system of research was in embryotic form at that time. So the opinion of those who have some doubt about the flexibility of our textbook – academy – big science based system is understandable. After all, a theory’s acceptance is only its respect’s indicator, but not surely of its truth.
On the other hand, the simplicity of this mass means slower than light, zero mass means speed of light equation urges caution. The ancient Greeks believed, inter alia, in the harmony, beautifulness and mathematical nature of “natural laws.” I don’t believe that the adaptation of the mental organs of our hunter-gatherer ancestors to their environment prepared us to understand the physics (after all, we have to use higher mathematics and other tricks), so it is reasonable to introduce an anti-Ockham rule. According to it, nature is not necessarily organized by simple and transparent laws, and it is always suspicious if an explanation is too elegant, too regular etc. Circle is perfect – but the orbit of a planet isn’t a circle. The history of physics is the history of the appearance of more and more complicated theories.