Non-emergence?

According to Robert Laughlin Nobel Prize winner physicist, Newton’s “fundamental laws” aren’t fundamental at all, since their rise is “a consequence of the aggregation  of quantum matter into macroscopic fluids and solids—a collective  organizational phenomenon.” [Laughlin: A Different Universe, p. 31.] So perhaps we can build up a physics based on the idea of emergence, and it is at least questionable whether either the fundamental laws or the fundamental constants remain important after reinterpreting this field.
It is undoubtedly an interesting idea, and I don’t have any problem with the approach of a new interpretation of nature. But I have some problems with this emergent approach.
First of all, why do we presuppose that the laws of the quantum level is more fundamental than the level of Newtonian physics? Because is it about a smaller magnitude?
Second of all, the use of the term of the emergence is sometimes resembles for the “God of the gasp”: Certain theologians interpret the gaps in actual scientific knowledge as a proof of the existence of the Lord. The classical example for the emergence is the ant hill, and I don’t think that the emergent interpretation is false in this case. But notice that the emergent approach offers an answer for the strangeness of a certain phenomenon (i.e. organized ant behavior), and, at the same time, it contains a tacit an assumption.
The “normal” scientific way is to observe a natural processes and then, by using induction, we deduce the natural law which resulted the given process. The emergent approach is different: we hypothesize that not some describable laws (that are descriptions of the rules) cause the phenomenon, but the phenomenon causes the effect. But, ad absurdum, it is possible that although there is a natural law to determine the organization of the ant society, having been unable to point out it, we would declare that this process’ nature is emergent. If Newton’s laws would be unknown, then we could state with conviction that the moves of the planets in the Solar System are emergent: We observe the process, and then we conclude that the process itself causes the phenomenon. Ad analogiam: how could we sure that there isn’t a law to describe the connections between the micro- and macroscopic level in Laughlin’s example?
Of course, there are emergent processes: I.e. Wolfram in his New Kind of Science presents examples where a process is uncompressible. But there are fundamental differences between math where, optimally, we can prove whether something is impossible, and physics where a similar demonstration is more problematic.
And there are other questions, as well. The dichotomy of “laws” and “objects” comes from Aristotle: He believed that on the one hand, there is a category of “natural things, which displayed change and complexity”, and there are “static and absolute truths” that are mathematical rules. [Barrow: World within World, p. 39.] Obviously, it is a kind of Pythagorean belief about the fundamentally mathematical nature of the Universe.
But it is an important question whether both the laws and objects really exist, as it is believed by the so-called realist philosophers of science. Opposite to it, the instrumentalists state that the physical laws are only instruments to describe the observed processes but they aren’t exist in reality.
It is undecidable which camp is right, since there is no an experiment to point out whether a natural law really exists or it is only a mathematical description. In short: it is pointless to debate over it.
Similarly, it is undecidable whether the individual ants’ behavior emerge into a coordinated activity to cause the anthill or the rules behind the operation of the colony drives the individuals.

Readings: applied philosophy of science II.

 Part I. of my short reading list contained some introductory books about philosophy and philosophy of science. Let’s see now some readings about the philosophy of mathematics; and cosmological and other works worth to mention. I am to underline again that this list is partly about my personal tastes, but undoubtedly useful for those are interested in this field without any previous experience. The only skill needed to enjoy these books is some affinity and tenacity.

PHILOSOPHY OF MATHEMATICS

1. Körner, Stephan: The Philosophy of Mathematics. An Introductory Essay (Dover Publications 2009).
This compact and comprehensive volume was published originally in 1960, but it is not obsolete even today. Sketches about Plato’s, Aristotle’s, Leibniz’s, Kant’s views; foundations of pure and applied mathematics; expository and critical chapters about the main modern schools of mathematics (formalists, logicists, intuitionists). 

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2. Hersh, Reuben: What is mathematics, really? (Oxford Univ. Press 1997)
More detailed than Körner with chapters about the “Criteria for a Philosophy of Mathematics”; the role of intuition and proof; misleading mathematical myths (unity, universality, certainty, objectivity of mathematics); “Humanists” and “Mavericks” in mathematics etc.

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3. Barrow, John D.: Pi in the Sky. Counting, Thinking and Being (Little, Brown and Company 1992)
Interpreting the subject in a broader sense and mixed with history, general philosophy, even theology. Connections with other sciences (i.e. computability and compressibility); mathematical heroes to Gödel and “transhumanist” and “Marxist” mathematics… This book is not only about the philosophy of mathematics, but about how it is embedded into our culture and natural sciences.

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4. Wolfram, Stephen: A New Kind of Science (Wolfram Media 2002)
online: http://www.wolframscience.com/nksonline/toc.html
One of the most exotic and controversial book about the rethinking the foundations of mathematics from a computational point of view. Wolfram uses “cellular automatas” (CA – it is a deterministic dynamical system) to model different processes offering an alternatives for the traditional mathematical/modelling approach. Although some of his generalizations are questionable in connection with biology or with the dynamics of society, the conclusion that “simple programs can produce great complexity” offers a new interpretation of both mathematics and natural sciences.

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COSMOLOGY AND OTHERS

5. Ellis, George F. R.: Issues in the Philosophy of Cosmology (2008)
online: http://arxiv.org/pdf/astro-ph/0602280v2.pdf
A short and deep survey about the main themes of philosophy of cosmology from the uniqueness of universe to the question of its origins to multiverses and the nature of existence. If one reads this paper (which appendix contains a summary table about the main thesis and issues), then he/she meets every fundamental problem of cosmology.

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6. Carr, Bernard (editor): Universe or Multiverse? (Cambridge Univ. Press 2007)
Reading into some frontiers in cosmology – this volume explains this subject from both philosophical and physical approach. Since the multiverse proposal is one of the most exciting questions of this field, almost every subject from Anthropic Principle to the concept of a mathematical universe based on Platonist ideas appears in this volume. The different chapters are written by different authors, so sometimes you find equations, but these studies are both understandable and readable.

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7. Lem, Stanislaw: Summa technologiae (Univ. of Minnesota Press 2014)
One of most unique book about the possible future of science and technology. Written more than a half a century ago by Polish science fiction writer and thinker Stanislaw Lem, it begins with an interpretation of evolution as a kind of universal problem solving process, and continues with diverse and exotic subject from cosmic civilizations to “intelectonics” (intelligence+electronics); phantomology (virtual reality), etc. A critics of this book compared Summa technolgiae to Thomas Aquinas’ Summa theologica, and it gives a superb example for creative thinking inspired by the promises of technology and science.

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8. Stapledon, Olaf: Star Maker (Dover Publications 2008)
Another SF author of this list – with a science-fiction book. Stapledon writes about the life in universe and its strange, almost unimaginable form and ideas and technological solutions which inspired the next generation of thinkers form Arthur C. Clarke to Dandridge Cole to Freeman Dyson. Beyond the fact that it is amusing science fiction work with philosophical insights, it is a gold mine for those hunt for new ideas.

Readings: applied philosophy of science I.

So do you want to study the problems related to this field?
Basically there are two kind of reading lists. The first one is for those who want to examine a certain field – i.e. the applied philosophy of science (after all, what else:-). The second one is for those whose aim is not to become an expert of that field, but intend to apply its results. This list belongs to the second category: I am aware that reading Kuhn or Popper (not to mention Merton or Hull or Aristotle) is a really enjoyable form of either recreation or scientific research. But it is not necessary to apply their results. So you do not need to read all the classics – it is enough to understand them to an appropriate level.
I collected some readable and easy to understand, but serious titles. They are usually available either in bigger libraries or via an online bookshop. Their subjects are divided into about five groups: general philosophy; philosophy of science; philosophy of mathematics (as the traditional natural sciences based on it); SETI; cosmology and miscellaneous readings.
My approach is mainly physics centered, but I hope that it is a useful list even for those who are interested in, for example, evolution. Obviously, there are other, equally good works about these topics, but they are my favorites, so this list at least partially about my personal preferences. My advice is to read them in the following order:

GENERAL PHILOSOPHY:

1. Baggini, Julian – Fosl, Peter S.: The Philosopher’s Toolkit. A Compendium of Philosophical Concepts and Methods (Wiley – Backwell 2010)
In accordance with its title, this volume is about philosophical tools and their usage from axioms and hypothetico-deductive method to the meaning of a priori; self-defeating arguments and Hume’s fork. Use it as a thinking toolbox – very efficient.

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2. Warburton, Nigel: Philosophy. The Basics (Routledge 1999)
Survey about “general beliefs” from the meaning of the life to the existence of God and the design argument; common-sense realism; negative freedom… etc. This book discuss these basic themes from a non-historical, problem oriented point of view.

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3. Scruton, Roger: Modern Philosophy. An Introduction and Survey (Mandarin 1994)
It discusses more subjects than typical for introductory texts from intentionality to modality and space and time in a lucid and readable style. Offers a deep and sympathetic understanding.

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PHILOSOPHY OF SCIENCE:

4. Okasha, Samir: Philosophy of Science. A Very Short Introduction (Oxford Univ. Press 2002)
What is science? Problems of reasoning, explanation, realism and anti-realism and philosophical problems of physics, biology, psychology... Short and compact summary of the main problems of philosophy of science – a good starting point to understand some basic concepts.

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5. Godfrey-Smith, Peter: Theory and Reality. An Introduction to the Philosophy of Science (Univ. of Chicago Press, 2003)
Deep and detailed guide to the 20th century’s developments from logical positivism to Feyerabend, Latour and feminist criticism. It was written for students learning philosophy of science, but accessible to a reader with general interest without any background in philosophy, as well.

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6. DeWitt, Richard: Worldviews. An Introduction to the History and Philosophy of Science (Wiley – Blackwell 2010)
In accordance with its title, it is about both history and philosophy of science. The story begins with Aristotle and his “grocery list” of beliefs, and ends with quantum theory and locality. DeWitt shows why a certain worldview (either Aristotle’s or Tycho’s) seemed to be acceptable to their contemporary thinkers, and offers an inner picture about these approaches. History and philosophy is interwoven in it, and it is not an accident, since both of them are required to understand the process of science.

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7. Henry, John: A Short History of Sceintific Thought (Palgrave – Macmillan 2012)
History of scientific thought as a fuel of philosophy of science. The emphasis is on the developments of science; a readable style with a lot of piece of information – even a historian of scientist would find both new data and contexts in it (unless he/she is an expert of the whole history of science from ancient Greek philosophers to Hutton and Baresh Hoffmann – but it is not too probable).

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to be continued...

Popper’s bridge - and why it repeats the induction fault

To oversimplify it: according to Popper, induction is not an acceptable scientific method, since a finite number of observations is unable to verify the truth of a statement. It is always possible that we would find a counterexample in the future. So the solution is falsification, and passing more and more observational tests is not a cause to increase our confidence in a hypothesis.
Now imagine that we have to build a bridge and we have two physical theories: an older one which is “tested many times and has passed every test… and a brand new theory that… has never been tested." Applying Popper’s logic, there is no an essential difference between them: neither of them falsified, so they are equally “reliable.” 
 Obviously, it would be simply stupidity to choose the newer hypothesis, although Popper didn’t have a good answer for this contradiction [Godfrey-Smith, Peter: Theory and Reality 2003, p. 67 - 68].
Popper introduced his concept to bypass the problems of induction. The bridge problem pointed out the weakness of a theory based solely on falsification. It is a similarly serious counter argument that Popper’s falsification concept based on induction, although his aim was to eliminate the logical problems of it.
He stated that a counterexample can disprove a theory. In other worlds: the result of a sole observation can be extended to every future incidence. But this presumption based on an induction, namely that if we repeat the observation than it will necessarily disprove our theory again. But following Popper’s logic which refuses the validity of induction, falsification can prove only that a model/concept/etc. actually don’t work, but cannot prove that it won’t work in the future – after all, Popper’s central idea was the rejection of induction.