To Destroy Literally Everything

According to Evgeny Morozov, there are two kinds of walls: stone walls and virtual firewalls (The Net Delusion, 2011, p. 45.). Regarding the previous one, it is hard to build, but relatively easy to destroy. A house of cards is an extreme example of it: difficult to create and easy to ruin. Opposite to it, it is relatively simple to build (to write) a firewall, but it is impossible (or, at least, almost impossible) to destroy if you don’t have a physical access to the computer which runs it. This is because both the stone wall builder and invader act on the same level: on the level where the wall itself exist. Opposite to it, a firewall attacker has to work on the level of the actual system, while the programmer creator constructs the firewall from a “higher level” or, if you prefer, from an external point. Notice that some there are “harder to ruin than to build” systems can exist in the physical reality, as well: e.g. the pro WWII French Maginot Line of a concrete fortification system is such a construction. But the two level nature of firewalls is more important from our point of view, so it shall be used as a metaphor. Applying this wall approach to our Universe, it is obvious that a house of cards world unsuitable either for life or intelligence since it is too sensitive to any disturbance: We can imagine a multiverse with continuously appearing and promptly disappearing cosmoi. This multiverse differs from ours: Edward Teller was afraid during the WWII that an exploding hydrogen bomb, because of the extremely high temperatures, would destroy the whole Earth, but we don’t have neither weapons to ruin our planet, nor our Universe even today (opposite to the alarm bells in connection with the possible dangers of the CERN’s supposed miniature, artificial black holes). Namely, the physical system of our world seems to be both intelligence and technology proof (and at least to a certain level seem to be even foolproof). It can be imaginable a universe which is vulnerable even to a relative low level technology. It was a popular belief in the cold war era that the answer for the Fermi paradox was that every alien civilization perished because of the nuclear weapons. This scenario is adaptable in a slightly modified form for a cosmic level supposing that the stability of the physics of different universes are different. Traditionally the end of a universe is interpreted as a “matter of fact” question, but from our point of view it, can be interpreted as a version of Anthropic Principle where the level of technical development is correlated with the physical laws’ strength to determine the whole universe’s fate. Of course, it is not known whether our world’s relative long existence is a result of only a stone wall style stability and it wouldn’t be too difficult to ruin this using a near-future technology. Or, we live in a firewall style world where we can act only under the level of physics. In this case we can destroy the physically existing Universe at most: Writing about Global Catastrophic Risks, Nick Bostrom and Milan Cirkovic discuss “only” the possibility of a disaster destroying “the potential of our future light cone of universe to produce intelligent… beings" (2008, p. 2–3.).
It would be even more fatal to create a super bomb–e.g. an artificial black hole–which can destroy everything but keeps intact the laws of physics. But this not the end of the possibilieties since it is imaginable that we could destroy somehow not only the physically existing Universe but the physical laws themselves too.

Existing, non-existing and other universes

“According to modal realism, possible worlds really exist” writes Jennifer Fisher in his book On Philosophy of Logic (p. 91.). This approach is based on modal logic that interprets true and false statements in relation to possible worlds: E.g. necessity means that the statement “is true in all possible words” (Ibid, p. 75.) and our actual world is nothing more than a world which was chosen from the set of other, existing ones. I don’t accept modal realism’s logic (after all, possibility isn’t equal to existence), but it is interesting from our point of view that the logic of modal worlds is similar to the logic of classic multiverse hypothesis that assumes the existence infinitely many words and this similarity shall lead us to a strange type of imaginable universes.
Max Tegmark interprets the multiverse as the manifestation of every mathematically possible world. It is a form of mathematical Platonism, and the main thesis is that on the one hand, anything is possible mathematically exists in reality. On the other hand, everything is governed by the rules of mathematics. “Mathematical” means in this case that every combination of different sets of physical laws and constants, or even different equations exist. In other words: according to Tegmark, all words can be described by mathematics and every imaginable combination is manifested in a really existing world. The core of Tegmark’s concept is that mathematics is equal to physics in a certain sense, since it describes the world ruled by physical laws.
But it is not sure that even our universe can be described perfectly by mathematics and perhaps only our belief suggests that every natural phenomenon is controlled by either deterministic, or probability or evolutionary laws. Inter alia, it is possible that the Great Unified Theory (GUT) doesn’t exist, since there is no mathematics to describe every connection. It is perhaps only about our inability to give a coherent description about reality, since our tools (including our minds, mathematics and logic) aren’t appropriate for it.
Or, it is imaginable that there are universes that cannot be described by mathematics at all: after all, mathematics is based on the presumption of the conservation of some rules. Thus, it is not necessarily well-founded to state that every universe is mathematical in nature. So we can imagine whole universes (albeit they wouldn’t be biofil) without mathematically interpretable natural laws. In other words: although they exist, they cannot be described by one or other mathematical form of physical laws.
Traditionally, we distinguish existing and non-existing worlds and the main sin of modal realism is that it intermixes these two categories. Now we can introduce a third kind of universes which differ from both the “existing” and “non-existing” ones and since per definitionem it is impossible to give a scientific description about their features, they don’t belong to the realm of physics.

Nonteleological World Machines?

There are two kinds of machines. A teleological one is a system where its “parts are so arranged that under proper conditions they work together to serve a certain purpose.” It seems to be self-evident for the first sight that every machine can be interpreted as a teleological system, since all of them serve certain purposes. What is more, a complex machine’s part can be regarded as teleological systems as well. A car is a teleological system, and, similarly, its engine, carburetor etc. has a purpose. (William L. Rowe: Philosophy of Religion, p. 57)
Teleological systems have two interpretations in theology: We can argue either that the Universe itself is or only some of its parts are teleological. (ibid, p. 59) Examples of biological teleological systems (e. g. eyes) are used to verify the existence of a Creator. But even accepting the teleological nature of the eyes (or human body, or planetary systems, etc.), we wouldn’t get answered whether He created the whole Universe as a machine to achieve a purpose and its parts serves His will or only our Universe’s parts are created to fulfil a task. In other words: even the verification the created nature of the eyes wouldn’t verify that we live in a created Universe.
Applying this distinction between the created (and teleological) parts and the created system as a whole, we get the following variants:
1. Both the World and the human race (and every part of the World) are created. Both the whole system and its parts have purposes (=ad analogiam a car). It can be regarded as the traditional theological point of view.
2. Opposite to it, we can state that neither the Universe nor its parts are teleological. It is the traditional atheist approach.
3. The World is created by a mighty entity, but the development of this World’s parts is regulated by laws independent of the Creator: For example, He constructed the Universe including the laws of evolution, and then the evolution resulted us. This it can be interpreted as a machine where the whole system (supposedly) has a purpose, but it is not true for its parts (and it cannot be true, since the Creator cannot be able to affect the results of the evolutionary process. Obviously, there are theologians who support this approach). It is another question whether the Creator would be able to find another solution for intelligence creation instead of the use of evolution. A parallel can be drawn between this model and the internet. According to Hubert L. Dreyfus, Ford’s automobile was a tool to support human mobility, and although it had some unintended effects (e.g. the liberalization of sex), it was a teleological machine. But because of its protean nature, the internet doesn’t have a “purpose”: It is a framework of opportunities. (On the Internet, p. 1-2)
4. The (or some) parts of the Universe are teleological systems, but the Universe itself isn’t. This model presupposes a Creator who is not outside his Universe, but a part of it. It seems to be the more exciting variant, since it introduces an inferior (Demiurge-like) Creator. To give an example, Polish SF-writer and thinker Stanislaw Lem played with the idea of a Cosmos in his book entitled Fantastyka I Futurologia (1970) where the actual state of our Universe observed by us was influenced by cosmoengineering activities of an intelligent race lived billion years ago. According to this story, their aim was to influence the density of intelligence in the Universe, thus our World satisfies the criteria of a system with teleological parts but without an overall teleological system.

And what is even more exciting: originally it was held that a machine (either a mechanical construction or a world) can be a teleological system which contains teleological parts (=car-like machine), but we have another metaphor now: An internet-like system where the teleological considerations aren’t valid on the level of its parts. The ultimate question is given: What other kind of machines and worlds can be imaginable?

The Landauer number: in search of the biggest possible number

“One the most fundamental observations… about the natural numbers… is that there is no last or greatest,” writes Grahan Oppy in the introductory chapter of his book entitled Philosophical Perspectives of Infinity. It is widely accepted concept– but it raises some serious questions.
We usually distinguish two kinds of infinity: the potential and the actual. The potential one means that if you choose n, then I can choose n+1.Obviously, neither a biggest number nor an infinitely big number exist if we accept potential infinity.
In case of actual infinity means there is no a biggest number and the infinity actually exists with each of its strange qualities (see the infinite hotel or Thomson's lamp, for example). Since the actual infinite unreachable with counting (after all, even an unthinkably big number is finite), we have to presume its existence if we believe in the existence of actual infiniy. In other words: the presumption of actual infinity’s existence is the basis of the presumption of the existence of actual infinity (which is a tautology). But we can answer that actual infinity is a kind of  mathematical abstraction – similar to the complex numbers.
In cosmology it is controversial whether actual infinity exist or we can accept only potential infinity. This question is not surprising, since the realms of the pure mathematics and the real physics is not necessarily are the same. So we have to take into consideration the possible differences between them.
Rolf Landauer pointed out that the computation – opposite to a mathematics which can be imagined in a Platonist manner – has physical limits. I.e. it is impossible to compute every point of the number line (or only a line segment’s every point) unless we have unlimited (actually infinite) computing capacity.
In our Universe we have a limited computing capacity - unless our Universe is eternal and we suppose that opposite to entropy's law we will have enough energy for calculations in the far-far future). According to Paul Davies (Cosmic Jackpot), the real numbers that are served as a basis of the natural laws in the traditional physics, simply don’t exist.
What is more, it means that there is a biggest possible number in our Universe. To illuminate it, consider the following example: If you have only a minute to write down the biggest possible number, then the limited amount of time limits your possibilities. It is unquestionable that even a mere 60 second is enough for the construction of an enormously huge number – but it is unquestionable, as well, that if our Universe is not eternal, then we have only limited time to compute the biggest possible result.
It would be interesting to find the most efficient form/algorithm/solution to calculate the biggest number that can be constructed in one minute or 100 billion billion years, but it is more important from our point of view, that this aspect of our physical reality characterized neither actual nor potential infinity, but a very big, but finite number that can be called Landauer number.
Representatives of ultrafinitism in mathematics states that there is no either actually infinite sets of natural numbers or very big numbers (2^10000, for example), since they are inaccessibly by human minds. This argumentation seems to be flawed, as it presupposes that the existence of a mathematical object presupposes that it is imaginable by us. The introducing of the Landauer number doesn’t causes similar problems.
So we can imagine three kind of universes: They are determined by Landauer number or potential or actual infinity. But notice that it is only about the nature of the time of a given universe, and either of the space or the mass density can be potentially/actually infinite parallel to the existence of Landauer numbers.

The nature of the natural laws

Although both the existence and the nature of physical laws usually are taken for granted, it is worth examining these ideas’ origin, since it can influence even the approach of today’s science.
Aristotle developed a rather complicated idea about the causes (ending with a kind of “Formal Cause” – which “causes” the form). His “Final Cause” became the modern laws of nature and his “Efficient Cause” is close to modern cause (Barrow: World within World, p. 53). So following Aristotle’s logic we make a distinction between the laws and those phenomena they affect. But it is not surely a necessary distinction between causes and their subjects. The fundamental question is whether the laws exist in a certain sense or they are only practical descriptions of reality. According to Lee Smolin, supposing a kind of cosmic evolution and the existence of baby universes that are born with slightly modified natural laws than of their parent universe's, this “evolving laws seems to be a breakdown of the distinction between the state of a system and the law that evolves it.”
This hypothesis makes possible to imagine some different scenarios between the laws and those subjects that are affected by them.
1. Obviously, we can accept the traditional laws vs systems differentiation.
2. But it is more exciting to suppose that the formation of a baby universe means the formation (slightly) different laws. It can be happened three different ways.

• The first one means that the law formation is restricted to the moment of creation (whatever it means). After the Big Bang we have a certain amount of matter, energy etc. and it won’t change. Similarly, the laws are “finished” as well and they won’t change. On the other hand, Smolin supposes that different universes can be determined by different laws.
• But why to restrict the changes of natural laws for a very short period of time? A second solution proposes a longer, even continuous evolutionary process where the forming laws and the physical environment are in continuous interaction in the course of the universe’s history. According to this model, not only the initial laws of a new universe are different from its parent’s laws, but the changes can be influenced by some events in the history of the universe and slightly different initial conditions would result very different laws later.
• To make the story even stranger, there is the problem of the saltation hypothesis. In evolutionary theory not accepted to suppose that biological evolution produces its effects via large and sudden changes, but cosmology isn’t about earthly ecosystems’ biology. The laws of our Universe seems to be fixed today, but it is imaginable that this idle period when our physical laws are static is only a transitional state, and then a sudden saltation would happen in the future and the nature of the laws will radically change.

Creating universe hierarchies

There are different and at least theoretically possible ways of universe construction– and we can repeat them.
The most trivial solution is creation by natural laws – it is presumably a relative slow process from a declared beginning (in the case of our Universe: from the Big Bang) to the appearance of stars, galaxies and intelligent life. It is another question why needed a so huge time for it.
Another possibility is a creation by creator – either in the form of computer simulation or by creating a universe using the laws of physics.
A third solution is a genesis thanks to vacuum fluctuations – in this case the Universe can appear instantly both with its whole complexity and with its thinking inhabitants.
It is imaginable that not only a hierarchy of universes exists where a whole world is created within another one, but the origins of the universes on different levels are either the same or different. A naturally evolved universe can be a home of an intelligence which creates an artificial world (say, by natural laws) which existing for an infinitely long time results the rise of a new universe with observers by quantum fluctuations, etc.
So our first (and trivial) conclusion is that is that regarding the “tools” which was used (natural laws, chance, etc.) we can distinguish natural and artificial origins – including into the latter category both a God-like creation and a creation by programming. A creator of a programmed universe is restricted only by the laws of logic: for example, he/she aren’t able to create a circled square. The opportunities of a creator of a physically existing universe is more problematic – obviously, his options determined by the natural laws. The main question from this point of view is whether a “world creation” means “only” the creation of the world as an object – similarly to a sculptor who formats the clay? Or, his/her activities includes the forming of the natural laws which rules the new universe, as well?
The second, similarly trivial conclusion is that there are two basic type of the hierarchies of universes: a homogenous and a non-homogenous. A homogenous universe hierarchy can be described as a chain of embedded worlds where the first one was created by natural processes; and then thanks to natural processes, too, a new universe appears within the first one, etc. Lee Smolin’s “cosmological natural selection” is typical example for it.
Obviously, mixed solutions are imaginable, as well. A universe with natural origin containing naturally evolved intelligence which creates worlds; an artificial universe where new universes arises because of natural processes, etc. Realize that this distinction between “natural” and “artificial” worlds are merely historical, since an outsider observing the creation of the hierarchy of universes can specify them, but it is undecidable if you live in it.

Super fine-tuned worlds and infinitely many universes

The typical “our Universe is fine-tuned for life” argument states that small changes in certain constants result a lifeless Universe. For example, a 2% percent stronger strong nuclear force’s consequence would be a lifeless Universe, since the formation of heavier elements never would happen under such conditions. “Although our situation is not central, it is inevitably privileged to some extent” says Anthropic Principle’s advocate Brandon Carter [In Modern Cosmology and Philosophy (ed. by John Leslie), 1998, p. 132.].
But as Stephen Jay Gould pointed out “any complex historical outcome – intelligent life on Earth, for example – represent a summation of improbabilities and becomes thereby absurdly unlikely” [ibid, p. 187]. So our special situation is not necessarily a consequence of the fine-tuning.
Similarly, Feynman joked on his luckiness, since he had observed accidentally the ARW357 license plate although the probability of it was practically zero.
And there are other problems with arguments about fine-tuning.
First of all, life is sensitive to some physical parameters. Opposite to it, computing is insensitive to the changes of almost all of them. But it doesn’t mean that our biology is extremely fine-tuned (or extremely matches) to our Universe’s conditions. Probably either a higher or a lower speed of light would not prevent the rise of life. We can play with the idea of a universe where the result of a minor modification of any parameter would result a dead world. It is not the case in our Universe, so we do not live in a so “super fine-tuned” world.
Second of all, “to be privileged” means that the given situation is not average but applying this to the biofil universe concept, there is an unspoken presupposition behind it. If we assume that there are some other universes then uniqueness has a meaning. In other words: if we hypothesize that only a finite number of other universes exist then the “privileged position” is interpretable. But if we are suppose that infinite other worlds (no matter how we define them) exist then we have to believe that infinitely many universes of them are identical with our one. What is more, in this case the number of lifeless; the biolfil and the computable universes are equal – after all, any kind of them have infinitely many identical copies. Thus the meaning of “privileged to some extent” is uninterpretable.

Fine-tuned for observers?

To be fine-tuned for life isn’t the same as to be fine-tuned for intelligence and a Universe which is fine-tuned for observers is perhaps different from them (although not necessarily). It is an interesting question since our World isn’t optimal for observations, while there are imaginable universes more favorable for it. But to live in an older Universe would be even a more serious disadvantage.
According to Avi Loeb, the viewing conditions were optimal when the Universe was a mere half billion years old and the circumstances were excellent to study the cosmic perturbations. On the other hand, Lawrence M. Krauss and Glenn D. Starkman pointed out that in an ever-expanding universe “presently observable distant sources will disappear on a time-scale comparable to the period of stellar burning,” and we will forget the existence of our Universe within a hundred billion years. So our position in spacetime is between the two ends of the scale, but it is far from optimal. We can recall the words of King Alonso X who said that he had “some useful hints for” a Creator to produce a World.
To give a trivial example: it is impossible to decide directly whether light source is a distant and bright object or it is a weak source close to us [G. F. R. Ellis: Cosmology and Verifiability. In: Modern Cosmology and Philosophy 1998, p. 121.]. It is imaginable – theoretically at least – a physics where this kind of problem is eliminated, i.e. because every sources brightness is equal; or we could find other, more sophisticated solutions (Cepheids seems to be exceptions with the correlation between their light intensity and period).
All in all, it is a laborious and uncertain work to measure the distances in our Universe, and in the absence of real knowledge, we are willing to accept an “unproven cosmological assumption” about the homogeneity of space as an extension of the Copernican – Darwinian revolutions. Then this unproven assumption is used to interpret astronomical information (including distances) [ibid, p. 123.].
This problem is caused by the nature of our World, and is not a desirable situation for observers. But the worst scenario is a universe where one cannot able to observe anything – I strongly suspect that this world would be lifeless.
So there are two possible explanations. Perhaps we simply live in a Universe which is neither the best nor the worst from this point of view. It is imaginable as well, that a really observer-friendly Universe is impossible, and so this is the best one within the framework of our physics.

Life, Universe and multiverse

According to Bernard Carr, “the Multiverse picture reduces the strong anthropic principle to an aspect of a weak one” [in Universe or Multiverse, Oxford Univ. Press, 2007, p. 4], since it explains our Universe’s biofil features by hypothesizing the existence of the multiverse. If we accept the existence of (infinitely) many other universes, it is not a surprise to find ourselves in a universe fine-tuned for life. It is a consequence of the selection effect: we can live in a universe which is suitable for life, while there many, lifeless worlds (obviously, without any intelligent observer).
This reasoning based on some unspoken assumptions.
Although Abraham Loeb argues [The Habitable Epoch of the Early Universe, 2013] that there was an opportunity for the appearance of the life already 10 – 17 million years after the Big Bang, it seems to be evident that because of the physical laws, a relative huge and old universe is needed for the appearance of life. Still in Loeb’s example, the criterions of the life didn’t appear immediately after the beginning. So at least in a world governed by our laws of physics, we have to wait for some time before the first organism can be created. Obviously, it is an interesting question whether a universe with different physical laws can produce life within the first seconds. And it is a more interesting question that how long time needed for the formation of the intelligence in another Universe. Ad absurdum, one can imagine a world where the basic elements of life are cooked in the twinkle, but evolution is another story, since it based on natural selection. So a lot of steps is needed to reach a certain complexity. The appearance of the intelligence at a very, very early period of the Universe would be a powerful argument for the existence of a Creator.
Turning back to the original questions, it seems to be a well-founded argument that there are some criterion of the emergence of life and intelligence. It isn’t possible them to come into being without some physical conditions.
It is imaginable that to the emergence of a biofil universe many other universes’ existence needed. After all, life requires a relative long past with relative huge spatial extension, and ad analogiam, it cannot be excluded that a universe fine tuned for life requires the existence of other universes.
Obviously, it seems to be a not too serious concept. But Carr’s concept is based exactly on this, since he leads back the existence of our biofil environment to the existence of other universes. According to him, our Universe was chosen by chance, but I can imagine that there is a connection between our Universe and the others, and this connection isn’t based on a kind of chance, but on some kind of physical laws.
What is more, arguing that only a few (or only one) habitable universe exists, Carr suggest that life is not a general phenomenon, but an exception. But at least theoretically it is imaginable that life is necessarily associated with the presence of the matter (although not every, but) in several universes.
Or, ad absurdum, we can play with the idea of an “Ultimate Anthropic Principle” which prohibits the born of any lifeless universe. Who knows – we have only one example for a biofil world, and it isn’t enough for generalization.